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Consequences of Disclosing Clinical Trial Results:  





We examine how the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 
2007, which requires additional disclosures regarding clinical trial results, impacts 
information asymmetry between the disclosing pharmaceutical firm and capital market 
participants, the general public, academics, and practitioners. We document a reduction in 
information asymmetry in capital markets. We also document an increase in adverse event 
and product problem complaint reports filed against the pharmaceutical firms to the FDA and 
a higher number of drug and medical device recalls for affected firms after the FDAAA 
enactment. Finally, cross-sectional analyses suggest that the increase in FDA complaint 
reports and recalls after the FDAAA enactment was more prominent in firms with a higher 
bid-ask spread decrease. Taken together, our results suggest that the FDAAA has some 
benefits for both investors and consumers. 
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Following the Vioxx drug scandal in the United States, where about 38,000 to 63,000 
lives were lost in part due to untimely disclosure of clinical trial results, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, requiring 
pharmaceutical firms to increase their disclosures of clinical trial results.1 The Act requires 
firms conducting clinical trials to register them on the ClinicalTrials.gov website, and to 
publish the clinical trial results within a year of trial completion (Public Law 110-85, 110th 
Congress). 2  In this paper, we examine the impact of the FDAAA on (1) information 
asymmetry between the pharmaceutical firm and its investors in capital markets; (2) on the 
general public, academics, and practitioners who are monitoring these firms through the 
adverse event and product problem reports filed with FDA and firms’ drug and medical 
device recalls. 
Section 801 of the FDAAA requires that all applicable clinical trials starting after 
September 27, 2007 or ongoing before December 26, 2007 have to be registered and their 
results disclosed on the ClinicalTrials.gov website. An applicable clinical trial is an 
interventional clinical investigation of drugs, biological products, genetic treatments, 
radiation, or devices, post-Phase 1, which falls under the FDA jurisdiction and/or is conducted 
in part or entirely in the U.S. (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015). This rule applies to any domestic 
and foreign entity (sponsor) under FDA jurisdiction conducting clinical trials, including, but 
not limited to, universities, research institutes, and pharmaceutical firms. A single clinical trial 
can be sponsored by a single, or multiple entities (sponsors).  
The major novelty of Section 801 is that it mandates registration and result publication 
 
1 Researchers started contesting Vioxx results after they were published in 2001 (e.g., Mukherjee et al., 2001; 
Jüni et al., 2004;). Vioxx was withdrawn from the market in 2004, after causing coronary heart disease in 88,000 
to 140,000 patients, from which 38,000 to 63,000 died, according to medical researchers’ estimates (Horton, 
2004; Graham et al., 2005; Maxwell and Webb, 2005).  
2 See Section 801 of FDAAA and https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/manage-recs/fdaaa. 
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within one year of trial completion (or termination). Completion of a trial is defined as “the 
date that the final subject was examined or received an intervention for the purposes of final 
collection of data for the primary outcome” (see ClinicalTrials.gov). Civil financial penalties 
will be imposed if a sponsor (pharmaceutical firms or other research institutions) conducting 
the trial fails to report their clinical trial results on the ClinicalTrials.gov website; other 
penalties may involve the withholding federal grant funds. However, compliance with the 
FDAAA remains weak (Anderson et al., 2015, Zarin et al., 2015).  
From a capital market perspective, it is ex ante unclear whether the FDAAA led to 
more valuable information being shared with investors and the general public. On the one 
hand, the goal of the FDAAA was to increase the availability and timeliness of information 
concerning clinical trials,3 which might be useful to capital market participants to better assess 
a firm’s competitive advantage.4 On the other hand, it is not strongly enforced. Although 
some firms choose to disclose all clinical trial results (e.g., Nisen and Rockhold, 2013), others 
decide to make disclosures on a case-by-case basis. In this low compliance environment, only 
around 40% of applicable clinical trial results get published on the ClinicalTrials.gov website 
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2015; Zarin et al., 2015). This finding suggests that only firms for 
which the benefits of increased disclosure outweigh the costs will increase their provision of 
information regarding clinical trials. 5  A firm’s decision to selectively comply with the 
disclosure requirement may be driven by two competing explanations with different 
predictions on the capital market impact of the disclosure. First, a firm has to have ample 
 
3 According to the ClinicalTrials.gov website, it is a “Web-based resource that provides patients, their family 
members, health care professionals, researchers, and the public with easy access to information on publicly and 
privately supported clinical studies on a wide range of diseases and conditions.” 
4 We discussed with an anonymous analyst covering pharmaceutical stocks on Wall Street who told us that the 
disclosure of clinical trial outcomes constitutes a key source of information in forecasting the firm’s future 
revenues. 
5 See Jovanovich (1982) and Verrecchia (1983) for the theoretical argument.  
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discretion in choosing the level of detail in its published reports.6 As such, it is possible that 
they disclose information that carries virtually no value to capital market participants, either 
because the report is not precise enough or because the results have already been leaked and 
hence are also already priced. Assuming that the non-compliance cost with the FDAAA is 
positive (yet small), a firm could produce non-informative reports. In this case, we should not 
expect any capital market benefits from these disclosures.7 
Alternatively, the positive non-compliance costs may explain why some firms commit 
to always disclosing clinical trial results. In this scenario, the theoretical intuition is that firms 
would not systematically disclose in the pre-regulation period and the market would not 
unravel all information possessed by companies due to the proprietary nature of this 
information (Capkun et al., 2019). However, the incremental monetary (and possibly 
reputational) non-compliance cost is pushing firms towards more disclosure. Under this 
scenario, firms would produce and report valuable information to market participants. 
Overall, the effect of a regulatory intervention towards more disclosure in a low enforcement 
regime remains an empirical question. 
We first examine the potential capital market benefits of increased disclosure induced 
by Section 801 of the FDAAA. We limit our study to applicable clinical trials and focus on 
affected pharmaceutical firms around the enactment of the FDAAA in 2007. We analyze the 
bid-ask spreads of 163 unique pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial result disclosures are 
 
6 For more details, see the FDAAA and the ClinicalTrials.gov website for examples of disclosures. For instance, 
detailed information disclosed for study NCT00729326, which tracked the change history of information level 
and trial results disclosed over time, is found at https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/history/NCT00729326?A=1&B=9& 
C=Side-by-Side#StudyPageTop. This view provides a side-by-side comparison between the first registration 
without results and the latest version with results. Edits or deletions are displayed in red and additions are 
displayed in green. This view shows the direct evidence that there is a significant amount of information that is 
disclosed once the results are published on the ClinicalTrials.gov website.  
7 This effect may be amplified by the disclosure forum. Indeed, the disclosed information is published on a 
governmental agency website, making it less clear whether investors will process this information efficiently. In 
line with this argument, Christensen et al. (2017) find stronger capital market effects when information about 
mine safety records is additionally disclosed in financial reports rather than exclusively on a governmental 
platform. 
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affected by the FDAAA over the sixteen-quarter (four-year) period centered on its 
implementation in September 2007. We use an empirical model reminiscent of a difference-
in-differences (DiD) design where we benchmark the change in the bid-ask spread of our 
pharmaceutical firms to that of various control groups, including other firms in the same 
industry, whose clinical trials results were not required to be disclosed under FDAAA, as well 
as the matched nearest neighbor pair firms from other industries. Our results reveal a 
significant average decrease of 59.71 (46.71) basis points in bid-ask spreads compared with 
other firms in the same industry (compared with the matched nearest neighbor pair firms from 
other industries) after the FDAAA. We find no supportive evidence that the change in 
information asymmetry (measured by the bid-ask spread) in capital markets precedes the 
change in disclosure regulation for pharmaceutical firms relative to various benchmark 
control groups. Our results are further confirmed when we limit the sample to only those 
firms that indeed disclose clinical trial results in the post-FDAAA period. They are also 
confirmed when we limit the sample to those firms that disclosed their clinical trial results in 
a timely manner (before the one-year deadline).  
Next, we investigate the regulatory consequences outside capital markets by 
examining the monitoring role of the general public, academics, and practitioners on 
pharmaceutical firms. In particular, we focus on 1) the change in public and academic 
attention to clinical trials and FDAAA related topics, as measured by a Google Trends web 
search score of clinical trial-related keywords and PubMed.gov medical science research 
publication topics; 2) the change of adverse event and product problem reports (complaint 
event records) filed by the general public, academics, and practitioners to the FDA against 
pharmaceutical firms; and 3) the change in the number of drug/medical device recalls filed by 
pharmaceutical firms and the FDA. If, indeed there was a reduction in asymmetry of 
information between insiders and outsiders, it would improve the ability of outsiders to 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533305
6 
 
scrutinize and monitor the firm, leading to greater public and academic attention, potentially 
more public complaint reports, and FDA recalls after the FDAAA. In other words, releasing 
results on clinical trials allows academics and practitioners to cross-check those results with 
their own findings and real-life cases. Arguably, this should lead to a higher level of public 
attention, as well as a greater number of public complaints reports and recalls.  
We first establish that a Google Trends web search of FDAAA clinical trial-related 
keywords “clinicaltrials.gov” and “FDAAA” and the number of related medical publications 
on PubMed.gov increases right after the implementation of the FDAAA.8 This indicates that 
outsiders perceived the additional information disclosed on ClinicalTrials.gov as potentially 
valuable. Furthermore, we collect data on medical device reports (MDRs) — adverse event 
and product problem reports filed by the general public, academics, and practitioners — from 
the FDA Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database and drug 
and medical device recalls data on the FDA website (fda.gov). We find a sharp increase in 
adverse events, product problem reports and recalls after the FDAAA, in number, scaled by 
the number of clinical trials and by firm. MAUDE recorded MDR complaint events 
(including both adverse events and product problems) increase from 17,558 three years before 
the FDAAA to 74,453 three years after the FDAAA, increased by 4.24 times. The total 
number of recalls (including both drug and medical device recalls) increased from 113 three 
years before the FDAAA to 482 three years after the FDAAA, increased by 4.27 times. 
Scaled by the number of completed clinical trials, recalls increase from 19.32% to 35.49% 
during the same period. After controlling for firm characteristics, the probability for a 
pharmaceutical firm to receive an MDR complaint report in the MAUDE database for either 
an adverse event or a product problem increased by 2.82% per quarter in the post-FDAAA 
 
8 Regarding the outcome of the FDAAA on scientific research, research papers with citations of the keyword 
“clinicaltrials.gov” increase more than that of “clinical trials” in citations, which serves as a benchmark for our 
comparison. 
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period. Accordingly, the probability for a pharmaceutical firm to recall a drug or medical 
device increased by 2.17% per quarter.9 A clear pitfall of our approach in this second set of 
tests is that since we now focus on FDAAA related topics, we lose our ability to use a 
benchmark group but focus on time series differences instead. However, collectively our 
evidence suggests that scrutiny on clinical trials from customers/general public and scientific 
researchers increases after the FDAAA. 
Finally, we examine whether firms that experience more public complaints and recalls 
also experience a larger decrease in information asymmetry in capital markets. This test is 
motivated by the events surrounding the Vioxx recall in 2004. In this emblematic case, once 
the results of clinical trials were made public, researchers started analyzing the data and 
conducting their own trials, which ultimately led to the public complaint and recall of the 
drug. We conjecture that earlier disclosure of clinical trials will allow for a better interaction 
between the general public and researchers that will ascertain the viability of the drugs and 
public market participants that are pricing securities. Such cross-checking of the drug 
development process should indeed lead to better estimation of future revenues by 
pharmaceutical firms. In line with this prediction, our cross-sectional tests reveal that firms 
that experience more public complaints and recalls are also the ones experiencing a more 
pronounced decrease in bid-ask spread after the FDAAA. 
Overall, our results demonstrate that both investors and the general public benefitted 
from the FDAAA. Our findings contribute to several streams of the disclosure literature. First, 
low firm compliance with the FDAAA yields a setting with both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure features. Our results add to the literature on the impact of mandatory disclosure 
with imperfect compliance, but also provide evidence to the voluntary disclosure literature. 
 
9 Given that the consequences (especially the effects of the FDAAA on recalls) take longer to be known than the 
market effects, the summary statistics of consequences interpreted here is based on a longer balanced 24-quarter 
period with 12 quarters in each pre- and post-period. 
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Related studies examine other mandatory and voluntary disclosure settings with varying 
degrees of disclosure requirements and compliance, and report mixed evidence on the relation 
between regulations and information asymmetry [see Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Hail 
(2002), Hail and Leuz (2006), Christensen et al. (2013), and Christensen et al. (2015) for 
international evidence and IFRS adoption; see Eleswarapu et al. (2004), Koch et al. (2013), 
and Bushee et al. (2017) for Regulation FD; see Jain et al. (2008) and Coates and Srinivasan 
(2014) for the SOX regulation; and Beyer et al. (2010), and Leuz and Wysocki (2016) for 
review of disclosure literature].  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the consequences of disclosure and 
reduced information asymmetry. These studies find that enhanced disclosure has a positive 
effect on various outcomes, including food hygiene (Jin and Leslie, 2003), corporate 
investment (Biddle et al., 2009; Shroff et al., 2014), social responsibility in the mining 
industry (Christensen et al., 2017), and environmental issues (Bennear and Olmstead, 2008). 
We add to this literature by showing that increased disclosure regarding clinical trial results 
leads to capital market benefits and helps stakeholders to analyze the drugs/devices, thus leads 
to more FDA MDR complaint reports and then the firm may recall the product for safety 
reasons. In this sense, our findings suggest that disclosure of clinical trial results might help to 
discipline product market behavior. 
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on the disclosures of clinical trial results. 
Anderson et al. (2015) develop an algorithm to identify clinical trials that were likely to be 
subject to FDAAA provisions. They document that despite legal obligations to disclose 
findings promptly, a significant number of firms do not report results to the FDA in a timely 
fashion, if at all. Williams et al. (2015) concentrate on clinical trials that were terminated and 
investigate the extent to which their data were disseminated. Other studies investigate a 
particular drug or device. For example, Jüni et al. (2004) study Vioxx and conclude that data 
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9 
 
from clinical trials should have led to an earlier withdrawal of the drug. We take a different 
approach and provided, to the best of our knowledge, the first examination of both the capital 
market benefits of clinical trial result disclosures and their association with product scrutiny. 
More recently, a contemporaneous paper by Hsu et al. (2019) finds that there are more 
suspensions of new clinical trials after the passage of FDAAA due to the improved 
transparency on drug development.10 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of 
the institutional background. In Section 3, we describe the data and sample selection process. 
In Sections 4 through 6, we present the research design and identification strategy, and 
discuss the results and robustness. Concluding remarks are in Section 7. 
2. Institutional Background on Section 801 of FDAAA and ClinicalTrials.gov 
The pharmaceutical industry is a crucial sector to human life and health, and it is also 
an important sector that accounts for one-fifth of the economy in the U.S. (Thakor and Lo, 
2015). Thus, a number of changes to clinical trial reporting have been attempted, proposed, 
and discussed. For example, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) 
of 1997 required all clinical trials to be registered with the FDA, and on ClinicalTrials.gov 
launched in 2000, which gave firms a platform to post their studies. However, it was not until 
the Vioxx scandal, which cost tens of thousands of lives due to untimely disclosure of clinical 
trial results, that the U.S. Congress passed the Food and Drugs Administration Amendments 
Act (FDAAA, Public Law 110-85, 110th Congress) in 2007, which requires pharmaceutical 
firms to disclose the results of their applicable clinical trials11 on ClinicalTrials.gov. For a 
 
10 Note that the change in composition of clinical trials towards higher quality drugs documented in Hsu et al. 
(2019) reduces our chances to document an increased scrutiny through recalls. 
11 An applicable clinical trial is an interventional clinical investigation of drugs, biological products, genetic 
treatments, radiation, or devices, post-Phase 1, which falls under the FDA jurisdiction and/or is conducted in part 
or entirely in the U.S. (e.g., Anderson et al., 2015). This rule applies to any domestic or foreign entity (sponsor), 
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review of how the regulation of clinical trials disclosures evolved over time, see Zarin et al. 
(2015). 
More precisely, Section 801 of the FDAAA also specifies and requires that all 
applicable clinical trials starting after September 27, 2007 or ongoing before December 26, 
2007 had to be registered first on ClinicalTrials.gov and their results should be published 
within one year after the completion of the clinical trial. Completion of a trial is defined as 
“the date that the final subject was examined or received an intervention for the purposes of 
final collection of data for the primary outcome” (see ClinicalTrials.gov). 
ClinicalTrials.gov is a publicly available government website initiated on February 29, 
2000 that “provides patients, their family members, medical researchers and health care 
professionals easy access to information about clinical trial studies on a range of diseases and 
conditions” (see ClinicalTrials.gov). The information on the website is provided and updated 
by the sponsor or principal investigator of a clinical trial. The website is maintained by the 
U.S. National Library of Medicine (NLM) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). 
ClinicalTrials.gov contains the registration information of clinical trials, but it was not until 
FDAAA Section 801 that there was a legal requirement for the registration and disclosure of 
clinical trial results. 
The requirement to disclose clinical trial results is enforced according to the 
characteristics of the clinical trial. Using this setting, we can identify the clinical trials 
affected by the FDAAA whose results require disclosure. Then we identify the treatment 
group of firms that have those trials, and we define our control group of firms that do not have 
any affected trials. Using this identification strategy at the clinical trial level, we can identify 
a control group firms that are closely linked to the treatment group firms in the same industry, 
but do not have clinical trials subject to the FDAAA disclosure requirement. In an alternative 
 
including e.g., universities, research institutes, and pharmaceutical firms. A single clinical trial can be sponsored 
by a single or multiple entities (sponsors). 
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identification strategy, we identify a matched and balanced control group of firms outside the 
drugs industry to assess our treatment effect using a cross-industry approach. Our within and 
across industries identification strategy enhance the internal and construct validity of our 
findings. 
3. Sample Selection and Data Employed 
3.1 Sample selection 
We follow Anderson et al. (2015) and Capkun et al. (2019) to identify the treatment 
firms, those pharmaceutical firms with clinical trials that are subject to the FDAAA 
requirements. For that purpose, we use the Aggregate Analysis of ClinicalTrails.gov (AACT) 
database collected from the Clinical Trials Transformation Initiative (CTTI) website.12 To 
capture firms impacted by FDAAA, we start with all clinical trials for the 2007-2014 period,13 
for which there is complete information on sponsors, registered countries, authorities, 
intervention type, and recruitment status. We only include the clinical trials that are funded or 
sponsored by listed firms or their subsidiaries. We exclude trials before Phase 2, as well as 
those that have not been completed or terminated, because they are not subject to FDAAA 
disclosure requirements. The remaining clinical trials are subject to FDAAA result 
disclosures, and we identify firms with at least one clinical trial subject to FDAAA disclosure 
requirements. We further restrict this sample to firms with the data necessary to conduct our 
tests. More specifically, we use Compustat and the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) to obtain financial data. We restrict our sample to firms with complete data for all our 
 
12 CTTI processes data which they obtain from the ClinicalTrials.gov website. 
13 Even though our sample period extends only to two years after regulation change (until 2009), we choose to 
use a longer (seven years) period after implementation of the FDAAA to identify our treatment firms. We do this 
to make sure that we capture not only firms that had Phase 2 and later-stage clinical trials to which the FDAAA 
applies, but also their competitors, which are firms in our sample period that had earlier stage or pre-trial R&D 
projects, and only later appear on the ClinicalTrials.gov website once they reach Phase 2. Broadly, a longer time 
period ensures that we capture all “active” pharmaceutical firms regardless of whether they had Phase 2 or later 
projects during our sample period. 
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variables. Our sample period runs from 8 quarters (2 years) before to 8 quarters (2 years) after 
the implementation of the FDAAA in September 2007.14 This yields a treatment sample that 
consists of 163 unique pharmaceutical firms, whose clinical trial results are subject to 
disclosure under the FDAAA. 
We use this treatment sample of 163 unique firms throughout our tests for both capital 
market outcomes and real consequences of the FDAAA. In our capital market tests, we 
compare this treatment group with two different control groups. A first control group is 
composed of 63 firms from the same industry (SIC code 283 - Drugs) that are not subject to 
FDAAA disclosure requirements. In this test, we thus use data for 226 firms over 16 quarters, 
yielding 3,616 firm-quarter observations. An alternative control group is composed of a 
balanced matched sample of 5,184 firm-quarter observations over the 16-quarter window 
from 324 U.S. firms, in which 162 pharmaceutical firms are subject to FDAAA (treatment) 
and 162 firms are the matched nearest neighbor firms outside the drugs industry (SIC code 
different from 283) (control). The matching procedure is used to identify the nearest neighbor 
paired firm based on total assets and R&D investment in the last quarter before the 
implementation of FDAAA. This test allows us to compare the impact of the FDAAA for 
treatment firms relative to control firms of similar size and R&D investment across 
industries.15 
3.2. Google Trends  
To obtain data on public interest in FDAAA and the ClinicalTrials.gov website, we 
hand-collect monthly Google Trends data for the search terms "clinicaltrials.gov" and 
“FDAAA” for the period surrounding September 2007, from September 2005 until September 
 
14  Following the literature, we exclude from our analysis the fiscal quarter in which the FDAAA was 
implemented to reduce the measurement noise in that quarter introduced by the regulation change. 
15 After matching on total assets and R&D/total assets in the last quarter before the regulation change with 
outside the pharmaceutical industry, we get 162 pairs of perfectly balanced firms; only one pharmaceutical firm 
does not obtain a satisfactory match. 
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2009. Google data show scaled search volume, with the values ranging from 0 to 100. The 
data are scaled by the highest search volume over the search (our sample) period. A value of 
100 thus represents the peak popularity for the term over the search time period, and a value 
of 50 means that the term is half as popular. We also collect Google Trends data for the 
search term “clinical trials” in order to use it as a benchmark against the change in public 
interest in the FDAAA and ClinicalTrials.gov. For each search term, we obtain 48 monthly 
observations from September 2005 to September 2009.16 
3.3. PubMed  
We use the PubMed.gov database to measure the interest of medical researchers in the 
ClinicalTrials.gov website. PubMed is a search engine of references and abstracts of research 
articles maintained by the National Center for Biotechnology Information at the U.S. National 
Library of Medicine under the direction of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). PubMed 
comprises more than 30 million citations for biomedical literature from the Medical Literature 
Analysis and Retrieval System Online (MEDLINE), life science journals, and online books.  
Similar to the hand collection procedure we use for the Google search database, we 
hand collect the monthly number of medical research publications containing the term 
“clinicaltrials.gov”. We also collect the same data for “clinical trials” which serves as a 
benchmark. We calculate the trend score the same way as for the Google Trend web search, 
by scaling the search frequency with the highest monthly search frequency over the search 
period. A value of 100 thus represents the peak for the number of publications containing the 
search term. We obtain 48 monthly observations for each search term from September 2005 
 
16 Similar to Footnote 14, in the regression model we drop the month of September 2007 when the regulation 
change happened to exclude the noise during that month. However, we still show the month of September 2007 
in Figure 2 (Panel A-C) for presentation purposes. 
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to September 2009.17 
3.4. FDA MAUDE database and recalls 
We use the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database 
(MAUDE) and the FDA website to collect data on reports of adverse events, product 
problems, and recalls of drugs and medical devices. Each year, the FDA receives hundreds of 
thousands of medical device reports (MDRs). The FDA uses MDRs to monitor device 
performance, detect potential device-related safety issues, and contribute to the risk-benefit 
assessments of these products. MAUDE stores the MDRs by mandatory reporters 
(manufacturers, importers, and device user facilities) and voluntary reporters, such as health 
care professionals, patients, and consumers.18 
The FDA also provides a list of recall announcements gathered from press releases 
and other public sources for FDA-regulated products. The list contains recall announcements 
of drugs and medical devices submitted by the firms themselves or initiated by the FDA. This 
information is publicly available on FDA website.19  
We hand-collect data on 55,177 adverse event and 97,343 product problem MDR 
reports from FDA MAUDE database, as well as 888 drug and medical device recalls from the 
FDA website for our treatment sample of 163 pharmaceutical firms over the 16-quarter 
sample period. This dataset serves the investigation in the main tests of real consequences of 
the FDAAA, which yields 2,608 firm-quarter observations for FDA MDRs and recalls.20  
 
17 We smooth the number of citations for every January collected from PubMed by taking the average number of 
the two adjacent months (i.e., December and February), because citation numbers reported in January in PubMed 
are outliers, as by default the number in January automatically includes all the publications published throughout 
the current year without specific information of the month. 
18 For further information, see https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/search.CFM 
19 See https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/. 
20 Given that the consequences (especially the effects of the FDAAA on recalls) take longer to be known than the 
market effects, we also perform an additional test on the consequences over a longer balanced 24-quarter period 
with 12 quarters in each pre- and post-period. For that test, we hand-collect 89,767 adverse event and 160,895 
product problem MDR reports, as well as 1,483 recalls. This yields 3,408 firm-quarter observations.  
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4. Capital Market Tests 
4.1. Baseline model 
We perform multivariate regressions to investigate the capital market impact of the 
FDAAA and focus on liquidity as proxy for a change in information asymmetry. Our 
empirical strategy relies on the prediction that firms whose clinical trials are subject to the 
FDAAA disclosure requirement provide more (or no) information to the market than other 
non-affected firms. We use a model reminiscent of a difference-in-differences framework, 
where firms with no applicable clinical trials (in the pharmaceutical industry or other 
industries) are the control group. We estimate the following regression model where the unit 
of analysis is firm-quarter. 
Model 1: 
Spread 100i,t = β0 + β1 • Pharma X Post + ∑ n · Controls i,t-1  
          + Firm Fixed Effects + Year-Quarter Fixed Effects + εi,t    (1) 
 
In Model 1, our baseline model, i denotes the firm and t denotes the quarter. We use a 
firm’s bid-ask spread, Spread 100, as a measure of market liquidity, which is a proxy for a 
stock’s information asymmetry in financial markets. We measure the daily bid-ask spread as 
the difference between the quoted closing ask and bid price, scaled by the closing daily CRSP 
price. We then calculate the average daily bid-ask spread in the current quarter and multiply it 
by 100 to determine the basis point(s), labelled Spread 100 (Balakrishnan et al., 2014). 
Our treatment group is composed of 163 unique pharmaceutical firms whose clinical 
trials are subject to registration on ClinicalTrials.gov required under the FDAAA. As 
discussed in the previous section, we use two alternative control groups (1) a group of 
unaffected firms within the drugs industry (SIC code 283) that presumably are exposed to the 
same economic trends, and (2) a group of matched firms from other industries but with 
similar size and R&D spending. In Model 1, Pharma is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm 
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is in the treatment group, and equal to zero in the control group. 
Post is a binary variable equal to 1 if the data date is after September 27, 2007, the 
date when the FDAAA took effect, and zero otherwise. The variable Post is omitted from the 
estimation as we have year-quarter fixed effects in the specification. In addition, the variable 
Pharma is subsumed by the firm fixed effects. Our variable of interest is the interaction term 
Pharma X Post.  
In Model 1, we control for firm-level characteristics that impact the firm’s market 
liquidity. We control for firm size (Ln Market Cap), growth and financing needs and 
constraints (Book-to-Market), financing structure and financing need (Book Leverage), firm 
performance (ROA and Loss), daily average stock return in the lagged quarter (Quarterly 
Stock Return), stock return volatility (Stock Return Volatility), and extraordinary events 
(Special Items). This list of covariates is derived from Samuels (2016). Firm- and year-quarter 
fixed effects are included to rule out other unobserved confounding effects at the firm and 
macro levels. In robustness tests, we also add quarter-state fixed effects to rule out 
unobserved confounding effects at the quarter-state level. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC 3-digit 
industry level to adjust any unobserved components in the error term that may be correlated 
within the pharmaceutical affected industry. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. In Panel A, we present the descriptive 
statistics for our pooled sample of treatment and control firms within the drug industry. Firms 
subject to the FDAAA have a representation of 72.1%, while 34.6% (22.2%) of firms submit 
results on the ClinicalTrials.gov website (on time) after the FDAAA. In Panel B, we report 
the descriptive statistics for our pooled sample of treatment firms and matched control firms 
from other industries. In Panel C, we provide summary statistics on the consequences of 
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MDR reports and recalls for the pharmaceutical firms subject to the FDAAA.  
Table 2 provides the results of a univariate comparison between the treatment group of 
pharmaceutical firms and the two control groups in the last fiscal quarter before the 
implementation of the FDAAA. In Panel A, the control group is the rest of the drugs industry 
firms (SIC code 283). The results indicate that the treatment and control firms differ on some 
observable dimensions (e.g., Ln Market Cap and Book-to-Market). Similarly, the results in 
Panel B indicate that treatment firms from the pharmaceutical industry and control firms from 
other industries, while matched on size and R&D expenses, also exhibit some differences in 
other observable characteristics (e.g., Book Leverage, ROA and Loss). Overall, we 
acknowledge that our two control groups remain statistically different from the treatment 
group to certain extent, and we managed to identify those observed control variables to 
construct the baseline model. 
4.3. Baseline regression results 
The results of Model 1 are shown in Table 3. In columns (1) and (2), we report our 
estimates using the rest of the drugs firms as the control group, while in columns (3) and (4), 
the matched pair firms outside the drugs industry are the control group. Specifications are 
different in columns (1) and (3) where no control variables are included in the specification, 
while in columns (2) and (4), firm-level control variables are included in the specification. 
The coefficients of our variable of interest, Pharma X Post, is negative and significant at the 
1% level in all the specifications, suggesting that the FDAAA decreases the bid-ask spread 
from the pre-period to the post-period for firms in the treatment group relative to those in the 
control group.  
Furthermore, the signs of the control variables are generally consistent with the 
literature. For instance, larger firms with higher leverage and lower stock return volatility tend 
to have lower bid-ask spreads (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000, Roll, 1984). Taken together, 
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these findings are consistent with our argument that the clinical trial disclosures due to the 
FDAAA leads to a decrease of information asymmetry.  
4.4. Pharmaceutical firms alternative treatment group 
We estimate our regression of Model 1 using refined pharmaceutical firms in the 
treatment group. We specifically identify those pharmaceutical firms that were subject to the 
FDAAA and submitted their clinical trial results (Pharma Submission), and those that 
submitted their results early in a timely manner before the due date (Pharma Early). We 
perform these two identification strategies using characteristics at the clinical trial level. 
The results in Table 4 are from regressions using Pharma Submission and Pharma 
Early with refined pharmaceutical firms in the treatment groups. Pharma Submission is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the pharmaceutical firm’s clinical trial results were subject to the 
FDAAA disclosure requirement, and that the firm disclosed at least one of its clinical trial 
results; zero otherwise. Pharma Early is a binary variable, equal to 1, if the pharmaceutical 
firm’s clinical trial results were subject to FDAAA disclosure requirement, and that the firm 
disclosed at least one of its clinical trial results on time (within 365 days of the completion); 
zero otherwise. Firm-level control variables are the same as those in the baseline Model 1. 
In columns (1) through (4) in Table 4, the coefficients of the interaction terms Pharma 
Submission X Post and Pharma Early X Post are negative and significant at the 1% or 5% 
level for all the four specifications, suggesting that the effect of the FDAAA on market 
liquidity also holds for pharmaceutical firms that indeed submit clinical trial results and those 
that also submit the results on time. These findings further increase the internal and construct 
validity of the findings for Model 1. 
4.5. Dynamic analysis 
We perform a parallel trend analysis to check whether our documented effect preceded 
the FDAAA disclosure requirement. In Panel A of Table 5, the results are reported using a 
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breakdown of our time variable by fiscal quarter, where Pre FQn is defined as the nth fiscal 
quarter in the pre-period before the quarter when the FDAAA was enacted on September 27, 
2007. Consistently, Post FQn is defined as the nth fiscal quarter in the post-period after the 
quarter when the FDAAA was enacted. In Panel B, the results are presented by fiscal year, 
where Pre FYn and Post FYn are defined similarly with fiscal year as interval for the time 
frequency. The variables of interest are those interaction terms between Pharma and Post 
FQn, as well as those between Pharma and Post FYn.21 Firm-level control variables are the 
same as those in the baseline Model 1. Year-quarter fixed effects and firm fixed effects are 
also included in the specifications. The control group in the regression for column (1) for both 
panels is the rest of the drugs firms, while control group in the regression for column (2) is the 
matched pair firms outside the drugs industry.  
The results in Panel A of Table 5 show that across all the specifications, the 
coefficients for the interaction term for the quarterly trend is only negatively and statistically 
significant in the post-period on Pharma X Post FQn and not in the pre-period on Pharma X 
Pre FQn, suggesting that the reduced information asymmetry is unlikely to be driven by other 
confounding events before the FDAAA. The results in Panel B also confirm our parallel trend 
assumption with year intervals. For an additional support in favor of not violating the parallel 
trend assumption, we plot our results in Figure 1 (Panel A and B). Overall, our results tend to 
suggest that the reduction in information asymmetry in capital markets is due to the FDAAA. 
4.6. Robustness tests 
We perform several robustness tests to validate our results. We vary the sample period 
of the liquidity baseline tests for these tests. In Panel A of Table 6, we find significant results 
for the 24-, 8-, 6-, and 4-quarter windows of the sample period centered on the FDAAA in 
September 2007. In addition to firm fixed effects, we also replace year-quarter fixed effects 
 
21 The indicators for Pharma X Pre FQ8 and Pharma X Pre FY2 are omitted and serve as benchmark. 
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by quarter-state fixed effects to rule out unobserved confounding effects at the quarter-state 
level. Our results in columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 6 are robust to this augmentation 
of fixed effects. Finally, our results are also robust in column (3) when we use the rest of the 
Compustat firms as control group in the regression, which helps us further enhance the 
external validity of our findings. 
5. Public and Academic Attention to FDAAA and Clinical Trials Disclosures 
In this section we investigate the impact of the FDAAA on consumers, researchers, 
and medical professionals’ attention and their monitoring role on clinical trial disclosures.  
5.1. FDAAA and public attention  
First, we examine whether the FDAAA has an impact on the public and researchers’ 
attention to the FDAAA and clinical trial results disclosures. We conduct two tests to see 
whether there is a general increase in Google Trends and PubMed searches of the keywords 
“FDAAA” and “clinicaltrials.gov” after the passage of the FDAAA. These measures are 
defined in Section 3. 
In Figure 2, Panel A, we present monthly trend analysis results from September 2005 
to September 2009 about the Google Trends web search score of the keyword terms 
“FDAAA” and “clinicaltrials.gov” (shown as solid line). The Google score represents search 
interest relative to the value of 100, which is the peak popularity for the term during this 
period; a value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. There is a sharp increase in the 
Google search score for “FDAAA” after September 2007 when FDAAA was enacted, 
although trend of “clinicaltrials.gov” gradually increases over time after September 2008 
when the earliest disclosure of clinical trial results subject to the FDAAA began. Panel B 
provides falsification test results using the search trend of a broader and more general 
keyword “clinical trial” (shown as dashed line), which serves as benchmark; this trend 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533305
21 
 
actually decreases, while the search trend of “clinicaltrials.gov” actually increases. Overall, 
the results in Panels A and B in Figure 2 confirm that there is a sharp increase in public 
attention to the FDAAA and ClinicalTrials.gov immediately after the implementation of 
FDAAA, suggesting an increase in public monitoring of pharmaceutical firms’ clinical trials. 
In addition, we use multivariate tests to examine this monitoring trend. The results are 
in Panel A of Table 7. We have 48 monthly observations for each keyword from September 
2005 to September 2009 (excluding September 2007). Dependent variable Ln Google 
“clinicaltrials.gov” US in column (1) represents the monthly Google search of the keyword 
“clinicaltrials.gov” (Google “clinicaltrials.gov” US) in the log form. Dependent variable Ln 
Google “FDAAA” US in column (2) shows the log form of the monthly Google search of the 
keyword “FDAAA” (Google “FDAAA” US). In addition, we create two other relative 
measures for the Google search trend. The first one, Google "clinicaltrials.gov"/"clinical 
trials" US, the dependent variable shown in column (3), is the ratio of Google 
"clinicaltrials.gov" US scaled by Google "clinical trials" US (the Google search trend of a 
general term “clinical trials” as benchmark). The other one in the independent variable, 
Google clinicaltrials.gov, is a binary variable equal to 1, if the Google trends web search 
keyword is "clinicaltrials.gov", zero if the keyword is "clinical trials". Compared with 
different benchmarks, the results in Panel A confirm the findings of the univariate results in 
Panels A and B in Figure 2.22 In conclusion, we find that there is a significant increase in the 
keywords “clinicaltrials.gov” and “FDAAA” after the implementation of the FDAAA, which 
suggests an increase in public attention to the FDAAA and an increase in public’s monitoring 
of clinical trials. 
In addition, we investigate the aftereffects of the FDAAA in the academic community 
 
22  The results in columns (1) and (2) show the increasing trend of the keywords “clinicaltrials.gov” and 
“FDAAA” after the adoption of the FDAAA in September 2007, while columns (3) and (4) show that a keyword 
search of “clinicaltrials.gov” in Google increases more than keyword search of “clinical trials” (as benchmark) 
after the FDAAA. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533305
22 
 
using the citation of “clinicaltrials.gov” in medical research extracted from PubMed. Panel C 
in Figure 2 presents the results of our monthly trend analysis of research publications from 
September 2005 to September 2009. The trend in research papers citing “clinicaltrials.gov” 
(shown as solid line) increases significantly after the FDAAA against the benchmark keyword 
term “clinical trials” (shown as dashed line). Similar multivariate results are reported in Panel 
B of Table 7.23 Both findings confirm that there is an increase in academic attention to 
ClinicalTrials.gov in terms of the number of related publications after the implementation of 
the FDAAA. This finding suggests an increase in the monitoring role of clinical trials from 
the academic community. 
5.2. Consequences of FDAAA on the general public 
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of the FDAAA on the general public. 
Specifically, we use regression models on MDR reports (including both adverse events and 
product problems) and recalls to investigate the consequences of clinical trial result 
disclosures.  
5.2.1. Research design 
We focus on the 163 pharmaceutical firms in our initial treatment group since they are 
affected by the FDAAA. We focus on the 8 quarters before and 8 quarters after the 
implementation of the FDAAA. We present our specification in Model 2. 
Model 2: 
Consequences = β0 + β1 • Post + ∑n • Controlsi,t-1 + Firm Fixed Effects + εi,t.   (2) 
In Model 2, Consequences includes different measures of the consequences of the 
 
23  The results in columns (1) and (2) show the increasing trend of the research topic related to both 
“clinicaltrials.gov” and “clinical trials” in the PubMed research database after the adoption of the FDAAA in 
September 2007, while columns (3) and (4) show that research topic related to “clinicaltrials.gov” in PubMed 
increases more than that of “clinical trials” (as benchmark) after the FDAAA. 
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FDAAA, such as FDA MAUDE, Ln Total FDA MAUDE, Adverse Event, Ln Total Adverse 
Event, Product Problem, Ln Total Product Problem, Recall, and Ln Total Recall. FDA 
MAUDE is a binary variable, equal to 1, if there is an adverse event or product problem MDR 
report filed against the firm by reporters to the FDA recorded in MAUDE database during the 
fiscal quarter; zero otherwise. Ln Total FDA MAUDE is the natural logarithm form of 1 plus 
the total number of adverse event or product problem MDR reports filed against the firm to 
the FDA recorded in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter. Adverse Event is a binary 
variable, equal to 1, if there is an adverse event MDR report filed against the firm to the FDA 
recorded in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter; zero otherwise. Ln Total Adverse 
Event is the natural logarithm form of 1 plus the total number of adverse event MDR reports 
filed against the firm to the FDA recorded in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter. 
Product Problem is a binary variable, equal to 1, if there is a product problem MDR report 
filed against the to the FDA recorded in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter; zero 
otherwise. Ln Total Product Problem is the natural logarithm form of 1 plus the total number 
of product problem MDR reports filed against the firm to the FDA recorded in MAUDE 
database during the fiscal quarter. Recall is a binary variable, equal to 1, if the firm submits a 
drug or medical device recall recorded in FDA database during the fiscal quarter; zero 
otherwise. Ln Total Recall is the natural logarithm form of 1 plus the total number of drug and 
medical device recalls filed to FDA database during the fiscal quarter. 
Given that this is a time series test, Post is our variable of interest and we predict it to 
be positive if the FDAAA had an impact on firms’ recall events. All the control variables are 
defined the same as those for Model 1. Firm fixed effects are included in the model, and the 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Due to the absence of FDA MDR reports in 
MAUDE database for drug and medical device recalls in industries outside the 
pharmaceutical industry, the consequences test remains ultimately a time series test without a 
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comparable control group. As a result, this test will remain non-identified and rely on within-
firm changes for treatment firms over time that coincides with the FDAAA. 
5.2.2. Summary statistics and results  
In Table 8, we track the evolution of clinical trials, FDA MDR reports recorded in the 
MAUDE database, and recalls by fiscal year from three years before the FDAAA to three 
years after. All of these numbers increase over time. Completed clinical trials also increase 
over time, with 585 trials in the three years before the FDAAA to 1,358 trials three years after 
it. The peak number of completions takes place in the second year after the FDAAA with 
1,466 trials. The total number of MDR reports (including adverse events and product 
problems) in MAUDE database increases from 17,558 to 74,453 over this period; the total of 
drug and medical device recalls increases from 113 to 482. Scaled by the number of 
completed clinical trials, recalls increase from 19.32% to 35.49% during the same period. 
However, the clinical trial result disclosures only start in 2008, which is one year after the 
implementation of the FDAAA. 
The results in Panel A of Table 9 show that, within pharmaceutical firms, the 
likelihood of FDA MDR reports and adverse event reports per quarter increases after the 
FDAAA. In addition, the number of FDA MAUDE reports, and adverse event and product 
problem reports all increase in the aftermath of FDAAA after controlling for firm-level 
characteristics. This suggests that the FDAAA disclosure requirement of applicable clinical 
trial results also had affected the scrutiny of the general public. Specifically, the probability of 
an FDA MAUDE complaint report (adverse event report) increased by 2.13% (1.82%) per 
quarter in the post-regulation change period. However, the recall usually happens after the 
receipt of abundant FDA MAUDE reports, which takes longer time to be effective. The 
consequences of the FDAAA on product recalls are not significant in the short 16-quarter 
window, which could be due to the delayed effect of recalls. As a result, we extend the 
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window and perform our tests for a 24-quarter window, where we find significant results for 
the effect of the FDAAA on recalls. 
Panel B of Table 9 shows the results for the 24-quarter window, 12 quarters before 
and after the FDAAA for the consequences tests in Model 2. The coefficients for the recall 
tests (likelihood and the number of recalls) become significant at the 5% or 10% level, which 
suggests that there is a recall delay effect in the later period. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows 
precisely the untabulated results about the effect of FDAAA on recalls by fiscal quarter and 
year in the longer 24-quarter window. This figure shows that the increase of recalls happens 
in the 11th quarter after the FDAAA. To further validate our prediction related to the delayed 
effect of recalls after FDA MAUDE reports, in untabulated results we find that after 
controlling for other firm characteristics, recalls are positively and significantly associated 
with the lagged (1 quarter or 4 quarters) FDA MAUDE complaint reports, showing that 
recalls takes longer time to be effective after the increase in the number of lagged FDA 
MAUDE complaint reports. 
6. Joint Effects of the FDAAA and its Associated Consequences on Liquidity 
6.1. Research design 
In this subsection, we combine our two previous analyses and test whether firms that 
experience more public complaints (MDR reports in MAUDE database) and recalls after the 
FDAAA also experience a larger decrease in information asymmetry in capital markets. 
Overall, in our first test, we assume that early disclosure is informative and document a 
change in liquidity. In this final test, we check whether firms that were effectively targeted for 
their drugs development post FDAAA (which confirms the usefulness of the disclosure) 
experience stronger improvement in liquidity. For this purpose, we estimate Model 3. 
Model 3: 
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Spread 100i,q = β0 + β1 • Consequences + β2 • Consequences X Post  
          + ∑n • Controlsi,q-1 + Firm Fixed Effects + Year-Quarter Fixed Effects + εi,q.  
(3) 
In Model 3, Consequences includes different measures of consequences, such as FDA 
MAUDE, Ln Total FDA MAUDE, Adverse Event, Ln Total Adverse Event, Product Problem, 
Ln Total Product Problem, Recall, and Ln Total Recall. The interaction term Consequences X 
Post is our variable of interest and we predict it to be negative if more consequences happen 
in firms with lower information asymmetry after the FDAAA. All the control variables are 
defined as for Model 1. Firm fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects are included in the 
model. The variable Post is omitted as we have year-quarter fixed effects in the specification. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
6.2. Results 
The tests on joint effects are executed only in time series within the subsample of 
pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are subject to the FDAAA disclosure 
requirement. The subsample includes only the 163 pharmaceutical firms for the two-year 
period before and after the FDAAA. The subsample consists of 2,608 firm-quarter 
observations. The results in Table 10 show that the coefficients of all the interaction terms 
Consequences X Post are negative and significant at the 1% level across all the specifications, 
suggesting that pharmaceutical firms with non-missing consequence effects experience a 
larger reduction in information asymmetry after the FDAAA.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impact of the Food and Drugs Administration 
Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007 on the disclosure of the clinical trial results of affected 
pharmaceutical firms. The FDAAA ultimately influenced the information asymmetry between 
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the pharmaceutical firm and its investors, as well as that between the firm and its consumers 
and the general public. We find that firms required to disclose information on their clinical 
trial results exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry in financial markets and are 
subject to more scrutiny by outside parties.  
Pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trials are subject to the FDAAA experience a 
lower bid-ask spread after 2007. The scrutiny on clinical trials from the general public, 
academics, and practitioners also increased after the enactment of the FDAAA. Thus, those 
pharmaceutical firms also experience a higher incidence of FDA adverse event/product 
problem reports and drug and medical devices recalls after the enactment of the FDAAA. 
Finally, although adverse event/product problem reports and recalls are associated with high 
bid-ask spread firms before FDAAA adoption, the adverse event/product problem and recalls 
increased the most for firms with the highest increase in bid-ask spreads. We acknowledge 
that our second and third sets of tests on consequences of FDAAA outside capital markets 
suffer from the lack of a benchmark for our treatment group. Overall, our results suggest that 
a weakly enforced law still generates some positive benefits to investors, and it attracts 
attention and reaction from the general public. 
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Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Variables Data Source Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable and Major Variables of Interest  
Spread 100 CRSP 
Average value of the daily bid-ask spread over the fiscal quarter, where the bid-ask spread is calculated 
as (ask-bid)/price using data on closing prices and quotes from CRSP, multiplied by 100 (to translate on 
basis point). 
Post Compustat 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if data date is after September 27, 2007, the date when FDAAA 2007 took 
effect; zero otherwise. 
Pharma ClinicalTrials.gov 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the list of firms whose clinical trials results should be 
disclosed on ClinicalTrials.gov website subject to FDAAA 2007 (Andersen et al., 2015); zero otherwise. 
Pharma Submission ClinicalTrials.gov 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the list of firms whose clinical trials results should be 
disclosed on ClinicalTrials.gov website subject to FDAAA 2007 (Andersen et al., 2015) and did disclose 
clinical trial results; zero otherwise. 
Pharma Early ClinicalTrials.gov 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if the firm is in the list of firms whose clinical trials results should be 
disclosed on ClinicalTrials.gov website subject to FDAAA 2007 (Andersen et al., 2015) and did disclose 
clinical trial results in a timely manner before trial due date at least once in the sample period; zero 
otherwise. 
Firm-Level Control Variables   
Market Cap Compustat Market value of equity in millions USD at the end of the lagged fiscal quarter. 
Ln Market Cap Compustat Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Market Cap. 
Book-to-Market Compustat Book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the end of the lagged fiscal quarter. 
Book Leverage Compustat Long term debt plus short term debt, scaled by total assets at the end of the lagged fiscal quarter. 
ROA Compustat 
Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets at the end of the 
lagged fiscal quarter. 
Loss Compustat 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if income before extraordinary items at the lagged fiscal quarter is negative, 
and zero otherwise. 
Quarterly Stock Return CRSP Cumulative daily stock return in CRSP over the lagged fiscal quarter. 
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Variables Data Source Variable Definition 
Stock Return Volatility CRSP Standard deviation of daily stock return in CRSP over the lagged fiscal quarter. 
Special Items Compustat Special items scaled by total assets at the end of the lagged fiscal quarter. 
Consequences Measures for Pharmaceutical Firms  
FDA MAUDE FDA MAUDE 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if there is an adverse event or product problem report filed against the firm by 
reporters to FDA in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter; zero otherwise. 
Total FDA MAUDE (raw number in units) FDA MAUDE 
Total number of adverse event or product problem reports filed against the firm by reporters to FDA in 
MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter. 
Ln Total FDA MAUDE (log form) FDA MAUDE Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Total FDA MAUDE. 
Adverse Event FDA MAUDE 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if there is an adverse event report filed against the firm by reporters to the 
FDA in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter; zero otherwise. 
Total Adverse Event (raw number in units) FDA MAUDE 
Total number of adverse event reports filed against the firm by reporters to FDA in MAUDE database 
during the fiscal quarter. 
Ln Total Adverse Event (log form) FDA MAUDE Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Total Adverse Event. 
Product Problem FDA MAUDE 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if there is a product problem report filed against the firm by reporters to the 
FDA in MAUDE database during the fiscal quarter; zero otherwise. 
Total Product Problem (raw number in units) FDA MAUDE 
Total number of product problem reports filed against the firm by reporters to the FDA in MAUDE 
database during the fiscal quarter. 
Ln Total Product Problem (log form) FDA MAUDE Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Total Product Problem. 
Recall FDA 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if the firm submits a drug or medical device recall during the fiscal quarter; 
zero otherwise. 
Total Recall (raw number in units) FDA Total number of drug and medical device recalls filed during the fiscal quarter. 
Ln Total Recall (log form) FDA Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Total Recall. 
Total Recall / Total Completion Trials t-1 
FDA and 
ClinicalTrials.gov 
Ratio of the number of drug and medical device recalls during the fiscal year divided by the number of 
completed clinical trials in the lagged fiscal year. 
Google "clinicaltrials.gov" US Google Trends 
Monthly Google trends web search records of keyword "clinicaltrials.gov" in the U.S. Value range is 
from 0 to 100. 
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Variables Data Source Variable Definition 
Ln Google "clinicaltrials.gov" US Google Trends Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Google "clinicaltrials.gov" US. 
Google "FDAAA" US Google Trends 
Monthly Google trends web search records of keyword "FDAAA" in the U.S. Value range is from 0 to 
100. 
Ln Google "FDAAA" US Google Trends Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Google "FDAAA" US. 
Google "clinical trials" US Google Trends 
Monthly Google trends web search records of keyword "clinical trials" in the U.S. Value range is from 0 
to 100. 
Google "clinicaltrials.gov" / "clinical trials" 
US 
Google Trends Ratio of Google "clinicaltrials.gov" US scaled by Google "clinical trials" US. 
Google Search Trend Google Trends Monthly Google trends web search records in the U.S. Value range is from 0 to 100. 
Ln Google Search Trend Google Trends Natural logarithm form of 1 plus Google Search Trend. 
Google clinicaltrials.gov Google Trends 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if the Google trends web search keyword is "clinicaltrials.gov", zero if the 
keyword is "clinical trials". 
PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov" PubMed.gov 
Monthly trend of the number of medical research publications on PubMed.gov with keyword 
"clinicaltrials.gov". Value range is from 0 to 100. 
Ln PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov" PubMed.gov Natural logarithm form of 1 plus PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov". 
PubMed "clinical trials" PubMed.gov 
Monthly trend of the number of medical research publications on PubMed with keyword "clinical trials" 
Value range is from 0 to 100. 
Ln PubMed "clinical trials" PubMed.gov Natural logarithm form of 1 plus PubMed "clinical trials". 
PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov" / "clinical 
trials" 
PubMed.gov Ratio of PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov" scaled by PubMed "clinical trials". 
PubMed.gov Search Trend PubMed.gov 
Monthly trend of the number of medical research publications on PubMed.gov. Value range is from 0 to 
100. 
Ln PubMed.gov Search Trend PubMed.gov Natural logarithm form of 1 plus PubMed.gov Search Trend. 
PubMed clinicaltrials.gov PubMed.gov 
Binary variable, equal to 1, if the trend of the number of medical research publications on PubMed.gov 
keyword is "clinicaltrials.gov", zero if the keyword is "clinical trials". 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Figure 1. Parallel Trends Analysis for Pharmaceutical Firms vs. Control Groups 
Panel A. Parallel Trends by Fiscal Quarter: Pharmaceutical Firms vs. Rest of the Drugs Industry Firms (Left) and Pharmaceutical 




Panel A shows the results from column (1) of Table 5 Panel A with year-quarter and firm fixed effects in the left graph. It presents the parallel trend analysis results for pharmaceutical firms 
against the rest of the drugs industry by fiscal quarter before and after the FDAAA. The right graph shows the results from column (2) of Table 5 Panel A with year-quarter and firm fixed effects. 
It presents the parallel trend analysis results for pharmaceutical firms against the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs industry by fiscal quarter before and after the FDAAA. 
The indicator for Pharma X Pre FQ8 is omitted and serves as benchmark. The coefficient estimates for each quarter are plotted, along with their 95% confidence intervals. 
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Panel B. Parallel Trends by Fiscal Year: Pharmaceutical Firms vs. Rest of the Drugs Industry Firms (Left) and Pharmaceutical Firms vs. 




Panel B shows the results from column (1) of Table 5 Panel B with year-quarter and firm fixed effects in the left graph. It presents the parallel trend analysis for pharmaceutical firms against the 
rest of the drugs industry by fiscal year before and after the FDAAA. The right graph shows the results from column (2) of Table 5 Panel B with year-quarter and firm fixed effects. It presents 
the parallel trend analysis results for pharmaceutical firms against the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs industry by fiscal year before and after the FDAAA. The indicator for 
Pharma X Pre FY2 is omitted and serves as benchmark. The coefficient estimates for each year are plotted, along with their 95% confidence intervals. 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533305
36 
 
Figure 2. Public and Research Community Attention on FDAAA  




Panel A presents monthly trend analysis results for the September 2005 to September 2009 period for the Google Trends web search score in the U.S. of keyword term “FDAAA” (shown as 
dashed line) and of keyword term “clinicaltrials.gov” (shown as solid line) before and after the FDAAA in September 2007. The Google Trends web search score represents search interest 
relative to the highest point 100 on the chart over the sample period. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term; a value of 50 means that the term is half as popular; a value of 0 means 


















































































































































































































































































































Google Trend Web Search Score of Keyword Terms "FDAAA" and "clinicaltrials.gov" in the U.S.
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Panel B  presents monthly trend analysis results for the September 2005 to September 2009 period for the Google Trends web search score in the U.S. of keyword term “Clinical trial” (shown as 
dashed line) and of keyword term “clinicaltrials.gov” (shown as solid line) before and after the FDAAA in September 2007. The Google Trends web search score represents search interest 
relative to the highest point 100 on the chart over the sample period. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term; a value of 50 means that the term is half as popular; a score of 0 means 
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Panel C presents monthly trend analysis results for the September 2005 to September 2009 period for the research publications on PubMed.gov database of the keyword term “clinical trials” 
(shown as dashed line) and of keyword term “clinicaltrials.gov” (shown as solid line) before and after the FDAAA in September 2007. This trend is scaled relative to the highest point 100 on the 


















































































































































































































































































































PubMed.gov Research Publication Trends with Keyword Terms “Clinical trials” and 
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This figure shows the untabulated results from the trends analysis of recalls for pharmaceutical firms by fiscal quarter after the FDAAA in September 2007 in the left graph. The right graph 
shows the untabulated results from the trends analysis for pharmaceutical firms by fiscal year after the FDAAA. The indicators for the pre-period are omitted and serve as benchmark. The 
coefficient estimates for each quarter are plotted, along with their 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
Panel A: Pharmaceutical Firms subject to FDAAA and Rest of the Drugs Industry (SIC 283) Firms     
Dependent Variable and Major Variables of Interest           
Spread 100 3,616 0.801 1.449 0.111 0.263 0.780 
Post 3,616 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 
Pharma 3,616 0.721 0.448 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Pharma Submission 3,616 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 
Pharma Early 3,616 0.319 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm-Level Control Variables       
Market Cap (raw number in millions USD) 3,616 5,444.000 14,619.000 123.600 328.700 1,550.000 
Ln Market Cap (log form) 3,616 6.233 2.089 4.825 5.798 7.347 
Book-to-Market 3,616 0.433 0.256 0.247 0.375 0.551 
Book Leverage 3,616 0.170 0.226 0.000 0.068 0.267 
ROA 3,616 -0.055 0.096 -0.111 -0.027 0.020 
Loss 3,616 0.582 0.493 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Quarterly Stock Return 3,616 0.016 0.283 -0.150 -0.002 0.142 
Stock Return Volatility 3,616 0.037 0.023 0.022 0.032 0.045 
Special Items 3,616 -0.004 0.018 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Pharmaceutical Firms Subject to FDAAA and Matched Nearest Neighbor Pair Firms Outside the Drugs 
Industry (non SIC 283) 
Dependent Variable and Major Variables of Interest           
Spread 100 5,184 0.865 1.628 0.111 0.253 0.857 
Post 5,184 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 
Pharma 5,184 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.500 1.000 
Pharma Submission 5,184 0.346 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Pharma Early 5,184 0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm-Level Control Variables             
Market Cap (raw number in millions USD) 5,184 5,921.000 15,551.000 99.670 328.700 1,630.000 
Ln Market Cap (log form) 5,184 6.183 2.220 4.612 5.798 7.397 
Book-to-Market 5,184 0.480 0.284 0.270 0.419 0.631 
Book Leverage 5,184 0.151 0.217 0.000 0.043 0.234 
ROA 5,184 -0.043 0.090 -0.090 -0.006 0.019 
Loss 5,184 0.531 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Quarterly Stock Return 5,184 0.012 0.284 -0.159 -0.004 0.141 
Stock Return Volatility 5,184 0.037 0.023 0.023 0.032 0.045 
Special Items 5,184 -0.005 0.018 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Panel C: Subsample of Pharmaceutical Firms Subject to FDAAA, where Pharma = 1       
FDA MAUDE 2,608 0.133 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total FDA MAUDE (raw number in units) 2,608 56.200 361.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ln Total FDA MAUDE (log form) 2,608 0.513 1.551 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adverse Event 2,608 0.121 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total Adverse Event (raw number in units) 2,608 21.170 145.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ln Total Adverse Event (log form) 2,608 0.397 1.254 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Product Problem 2,608 0.108 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total Product Problem (raw number in units) 2,608 37.330 251.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ln Total Product Problem (log form) 2,608 0.423 1.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Recall 2,608 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total Recall (raw number in units) 2,608 0.340 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ln Total Recall (log form) 2,608 0.072 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for three different samples. In Panel A, the first 
sample consists of 163 pharmaceutical firms subject to the FDAAA and 63 firms in the drugs industry (SIC code 283), which 
include in total 226 U.S. firms and 3,616 firm-quarter observations over the 2005 to 2009 period. In Panel B, the sample 
consists of 162 pharmaceutical firms subject to the FDAAA and 162 matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs 
industry (SIC code different from 283), which includes 324 U.S. firms and 5,184 firm-quarter observations over the 2005 to 
2009 period. In Panel C, the sample is the subsample of pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trials are subject to the FDAAA 
and consists of 2,608 firm-quarter observations from 163 pharmaceutical firms over 2005 to 2009 period. We collect clinical 
trial data from the Aggregate Analysis of ClincalTrials.gov (AACT) database obtained through Clinical Trials 
Transformation Initiative (CTTI) website, whose data source is ClinicalTrials.gov website as of March 27, 2015. We match 
clinical trials data by company name with Compustat and CRSP to get financial statement data. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 2. Univariate Analysis Results of Treatment Group and Control Group  
Panel A: Pharmaceutical Firms subject to FDAAA vs. the Rest of the Drugs Industry 
(SIC 283) Firms 
 (1) (2) (1) - (2)  
 
Pharmaceutical Firms 
subject to FDAAA 
Rest of the Drugs 
Industry (SIC 283) 
Firms 
  
 163 firm observations 63 firm observations   
Variables 72.12% 27.88%   
     
Spread 100 0.335 0.725 -0.390 *** 
Market Cap 7761.608 678.395 7083.213 *** 
Ln Market Cap 6.777 5.551 1.226 *** 
Book-to-Market 0.350 0.418 -0.068 ** 
Book Leverage 0.173 0.132 0.041   
ROA -0.062 -0.047 -0.015   
Loss 0.626 0.524 0.102   
Quarterly Stock Return 0.031 0.024 0.007   
Stock Return Volatility 0.028 0.030 -0.002   
Special Items -0.003 -0.005 0.002   
This panel presents univariate comparison in the averages of dependent variable and all the control variables between 
pharmaceutical firms subject to FDAAA in the treatment group and the rest of the drugs industry (SIC code 283) firms in the 
control group for the last fiscal quarter before the regulatory change. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Pharmaceutical Firms subject to FDAAA vs. Matched Nearest Neighbor Pair 
Firms outside Drugs Industry (non SIC 283) 
  (1) (2) (1) - (2)   
  
Pharmaceutical Firms 
subject to FDAAA 
Matched Nearest 
Neighbor Pair Firms 
outside the Drugs 
Industry (non SIC 283) 
    
  162 firm observations 162 firm observations     
  50.00% 50.00%     
          
Spread 100 0.332 0.598 -0.266 *** 
Market Cap 7809.119 4687.408 3121.711 * 
Ln Market Cap 6.793 5.999 0.794 *** 
Book-to-Market 0.351 0.454 -0.103 *** 
Book Leverage 0.174 0.119 0.054 ** 
ROA -0.061 -0.024 -0.036 *** 
Loss 0.623 0.500 0.123 ** 
Quarterly Stock Return 0.031 0.030 0.002   
Stock Return Volatility 0.028 0.029 -0.001   
Special Items -0.003 -0.004 0.001   
This panel presents univariate comparison in the averages of dependent variable and all the control variables between 
pharmaceutical firms subject to FDAAA in the treatment group and the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs 
industry (SIC code different from 283) in the control group for the last fiscal quarter before the regulatory change. Please 
refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Baseline Regression Results 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 
          
Pharma X Post -0.6984*** -0.5971*** -0.5338*** -0.4671*** 
  (-9.78) (-10.97) (-3.17) (-2.82) 
Ln Market Cap  -0.8280***  -0.6211*** 
   (-36.54)  (-6.07) 
Book-to-Market  0.3575*  0.5476* 
   (1.96)  (1.91) 
Book Leverage  -0.1889***  0.0506 
   (-3.02)  (0.26) 
ROA  0.4214**  -0.3555 
   (2.88)  (-1.18) 
Loss  0.2316***  -0.0706 
   (3.15)  (-1.07) 
Quarterly Stock Return  -0.0555*  -0.0999* 
   (-1.78)  (-1.74) 
Stock Return Volatility  5.1532***  11.4859** 
   (12.43)  (2.19) 
Special Items  2.2243***  2.2163** 
   (8.62)  (2.65) 
Constant 1.0525*** 5.7621*** 0.9989*** 4.1569*** 
  (40.89) (21.11) (23.70) (4.61) 
          
Observations 3,616 3,616 5,184 5,184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5917 0.6977 0.5998 0.6652 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Control group 
Rest of Drugs 
Industry (SIC 283) 
Firms 
Rest of Drugs 











(non SIC 283) 
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level 
This table presents regression results pertaining to the difference-in-difference analysis of bid-ask spread change before and 
after the FDAAA in the treatment group versus the control group. The treatment group includes pharmaceutical firms whose 
clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following the FDAAA. Control groups are the rest of the drugs industry (SIC 
code 283) in columns (1) and (2) and the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs industry (SIC code different 
from 283) in columns (3) and (4). Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC 3-digit industry 
level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Pharmaceutical Firms Alternative Treatment Group Test 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 
          
Pharma Submission X Post -0.4350***   -0.4420***   
  (-14.08)   (-3.23)   
Pharma Early X Post   -0.3072**   -0.3745*** 
    (-2.79)   (-3.67) 
Constant 5.5354*** 5.4700*** 4.0216*** 3.9624*** 
  (15.05) (13.01) (4.71) (4.73) 
          
Observations 3,616 3,616 5,184 5,184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6947 0.6913 0.6641 0.6621 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Control group 
Rest of Drugs 
Industry (SIC 
283) Firms 












(non SIC 283) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level 
This table presents regression results pertaining to the difference-in-difference analysis of bid-ask spread change before and 
after FDAAA regulatory change in treatment group as opposed to control group. Treatment group includes pharmaceutical 
firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement and who indeed disclosed their 
results in columns (1) and (3). Treatment group includes pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be 
disclosed following FDAAA requirement and who indeed disclosed their results on time within the required disclosure 
period in columns (2) and (4). Control groups are the rest of the drugs industry firms (SIC code 283) in columns (1) and (2) 
and the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs industry (SIC code different from 283) in columns (3) and (4). 
Firm-level control variables are the same as those in the baseline model in Table 3. Please refer to Appendix for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the SIC 3-digit industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Parallel Trend Analysis for Pharmaceutical Firms by Quarter and Year 
Panel A: Parallel Trend Analysis for Pharmaceutical Firms by Quarter 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 
      
Pharma X Pre FQ7 0.0088 -0.0097 
  (0.40) (-0.17) 
Pharma X Pre FQ6 0.0205 0.0201 
  (0.55) (0.36) 
Pharma X Pre FQ5 0.0303 0.0567 
  (1.03) (0.96) 
Pharma X Pre FQ4 -0.0012 -0.0045 
  (-0.04) (-0.08) 
Pharma X Pre FQ3 0.0262 0.0679 
  (1.68) (1.31) 
Pharma X Pre FQ2 0.0621** 0.1017 
  (2.45) (1.45) 
Pharma X Pre FQ1 -0.0173 0.0062 
  (-0.56) (0.09) 
Pharma X Post FQ1 -0.0829* 0.0160 
  (-1.91) (0.17) 
Pharma X Post FQ2 -0.2645*** -0.2401* 
  (-5.59) (-1.94) 
Pharma X Post FQ3 -0.4252*** -0.2535** 
  (-5.97) (-2.32) 
Pharma X Post FQ4 -0.8261*** -0.3904** 
  (-9.69) (-2.55) 
Pharma X Post FQ5 -1.0575*** -0.6804** 
  (-11.57) (-2.49) 
Pharma X Post FQ6 -0.8282*** -0.7070** 
  (-7.22) (-2.41) 
Pharma X Post FQ7 -0.7249*** -0.6753** 
  (-11.45) (-2.58) 
Pharma X Post FQ8 -0.4222*** -0.5584** 
  (-6.14) (-2.60) 
Constant 5.7998*** 4.2044*** 
  (23.09) (4.56) 
      
Observations 3,616 5,184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7016 0.6672 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 quarters / 8 quarters in 
the pre- and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 8 quarters 
in the pre- and post- period each 
Control group 
Rest of Drugs Industry (SIC 283) 
Firms 
Matched Nearest Neighbor Pair 
Firms outside Drugs Industry (non 
SIC 283) 
Control variables YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Model OLS OLS 
Standard error Industry-level Industry-level 
This table panel presents parallel trend regression results pertaining to the difference-in-difference analysis of bid-ask spread 
change by quarter before and after FDAAA regulatory change in treatment group as opposed to control group. Treatment 
group includes pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement. 
Control groups are the rest of the drugs industry firms (SIC code 283) in column (1) and the matched nearest neighbor pair 
firms outside the drugs industry (SIC code different from 283) in column (2). Firm-level control variables are the same as 
those in the baseline model in Table 3. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC 
3-digit industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Panel B: Parallel Trend Analysis for Pharmaceutical Firms by Year 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 
      
Pharma X Pre FY1 0.0012 0.0246 
  (0.10) (1.10) 
Pharma X Post FY1 -0.4215*** -0.2401*** 
  (-10.06) (-2.73) 
Pharma X Post FY2 -0.7692*** -0.6704** 
  (-12.48) (-2.66) 
Constant 5.7911*** 4.1880*** 
  (22.80) (4.55) 
      
Observations 3,616 5,184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6992 0.6673 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 quarters / 8 quarters in 
the pre- and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 8 quarters in 
the pre- and post- period each 
Control group 
Rest of Drugs Industry (SIC 283) 
Firms 
Matched Nearest Neighbor Pair 
Firms outside Drugs Industry (non 
SIC 283) 
Control variables YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Model OLS OLS 
Standard error Industry-level Industry-level 
This table panel presents parallel trend regression results pertaining to the difference-in-difference analysis of bid-ask spread 
change by year before and after FDAAA regulatory change in treatment group as opposed to control group. Treatment group 
includes pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement. 
Control groups are the rest of the drugs industry firms (SIC code 283) in column (1) and the matched nearest neighbor pair 
firms outside the drugs industry (SIC code different from 283) in column (2). Firm-level control variables are the same as 
those in the baseline model in Table 3. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC 
3-digit industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 




Table 6. Robustness Tests 
Panel A: Robustness Test – Baseline Model in Different Sample Period Windows 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 
                  
Pharma X Post -0.3791*** -0.3425*** -0.4142*** -0.2453*** -0.3121*** -0.1950** -0.2645*** -0.1599** 
  (-9.80) (-3.09) (-10.50) (-2.75) (-8.06) (-2.52) (-7.57) (-2.38) 
Constant 4.9373*** 4.1133*** 4.6294*** 4.5478*** 3.6755*** 4.4742*** 2.8107*** 4.6938*** 
  (48.72) (6.85) (21.98) (5.77) (15.44) (7.47) (8.22) (7.31) 
                  
Observations 4,632 6,816 1,808 2,592 1,356 1,944 904 1,296 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7049 0.6899 0.7670 0.7270 0.8067 0.7506 0.8023 0.7434 
Sample period 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 8 
quarters / 4 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 8 
quarters / 4 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 6 
quarters / 3 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 6 
quarters / 3 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 4 
quarters / 2 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 4 
quarters / 2 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Control group 







(non SIC 283) 







(non SIC 283) 







(non SIC 283) 







(non SIC 283) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter X State FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level 
This table presents robustness tests on regression results pertaining to the difference-in-difference analysis of bid-ask spread change before and after FDAAA regulatory change in treatment group as opposed to 
control group in different sample period windows. Treatment group includes pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement. Control groups are the rest 
of the drugs industry (SIC code 283) in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), and the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs industry (SIC code different from 283) in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Sample 
period in columns (1) and (2) is extended to 24 quarters (6 years) with 12 quarters (3 years) in pre and post period each of regulatory change, while sample period in columns (3) and (4) is shortened to 8 quarters (2 
years) with 4 quarters (1 year) in pre and post period each of regulatory change. Sample period in columns (5) through (8) is shortened to less than 8 quarters (2 years), with 6 quarters in columns (5) and (6), and 4 
quarters in columns (7) and (8). Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors 
are clustered at the SIC 3-digit industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 





Panel B: Robustness Test – Baseline Model with Year-Quarter X State Fixed Effects and 
Compustat Firms as Control Group 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 
        
Pharma X Post -0.4895*** -0.3677*** -0.2646*** 
  (-6.79) (-2.69) (-2.65) 
Constant 5.6526*** 4.6101*** 4.9283*** 
  (35.98) (5.32) (5.17) 
        
Observations 3,536 5,016 50,816 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6962 0.6793 0.6755 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- and 
post- period each 
Control group 
Rest of Drugs Industry 
(SIC 283) Firms 
Matched Nearest 
Neighbor Pair Firms 
outside Drugs Industry 
(non SIC 283) 
Rest of Compustat Firms 
Control variables YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE NO NO YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter X State FE YES YES NO 
Model OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Industry-level Industry-level Industry-level 
This table presents robustness tests on regression results pertaining to the difference-in-difference analysis of bid-ask spread 
change before and after FDAAA regulatory change in treatment group as opposed to control group. Treatment group includes 
pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement. Control groups 
are the rest of the drugs industry (SIC code 283) in column (1), the matched nearest neighbor pair firms outside the drugs 
industry (SIC code different from 283) in column (2), and the rest of Compustat firms in column 3. Year-Quarter fixed 
effects are replaced by Year-Quarter X State fixed effects in columns (1) and (2). Please refer to Appendix for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Standard errors are clustered at the SIC 3-digit industry level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 




Table 7. Google Trends Web Search and PubMed Research Trends in the U.S. 
Panel A: Google Trends Web Search  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln Google "clinicaltrials.gov" US Ln Google "FDAAA" US 
Google  "clinicaltrials.gov" / "clinical 
trials" US 
Ln Google Search Trend 
          
Post 0.4513*** 3.8463*** 0.4011*** -0.1498** 
  (5.41) (18.38) (5.54) (-2.34) 
Google clinicaltrials.gov       -0.8428*** 
        (-13.16) 
Google clinicaltrials.gov X Post       0.6056*** 
        (6.69) 
Constant 3.4287*** 0.3683** 0.4343*** 4.2698*** 
  (58.10) (2.49) (8.49) (94.30) 
          
Observations 48 48 48 96 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3754 0.8775 0.3873 0.6728 
Sample period 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the 
pre- and post- period each 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the 
pre- and post- period each 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the 
pre- and post- period each 
Scope U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Subsample Google Trend Web Search Google Trend Web Search Google Trend Web Search Google Trend Web Search 
Panel B: PubMed Research Trends 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov" Ln PubMed "clinical trials" 
PubMed "clinicaltrials.gov" / "clinical 
trials" 
Ln PubMed.gov Research Trend 
          
Post 1.6878*** 0.1582*** 0.5971*** 0.1582 
  (10.56) (6.51) (13.26) (1.43) 
PubMed clinicaltrials.gov       -1.7713*** 
        (-16.03) 
PubMed clinicaltrials.gov X Post       1.5197*** 
        (9.73) 
Constant 2.5265*** 4.3085*** 0.1966*** 4.3087*** 
  (22.35) (250.56) (6.17) (55.16) 
          
Observations 48 48 48 96 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7015 0.4679 0.7882 0.8070 
Sample period 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the 
pre- and post- period each 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the 
pre- and post- period each 
Balanced 48 months / 24 months in the 
pre- and post- period each 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Subsample PubMed.gov PubMed.gov PubMed.gov PubMed.gov 
This table presents regression results pertaining to the monthly trend analysis over the 48-month period from September 2005 to September 2009 about Google Trends Web Search in Panel A and PubMed 
Research Trends in Panel B before and after FDAAA regulatory change. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 

















Total recall Drug recall 
Medical device 
recall 




Pre FY3 585 0 17,558 5,140 13,244 113 0 113 19.32% 
Pre FY2 710 0 27,955 7,415 21,658 105 1 104 14.79% 
Pre FY1 938 0 22,363 9,760 14,684 133 3 130 14.18% 
Post FY1 1,230 12 36,963 14,993 25,205 240 1 239 19.51% 
Post FY2 1,466 409 59,237 23,009 35,796 410 6 404 27.97% 
Post FY3 1,358 552 74,453 29,450 50,308 482 21 461 35.49% 
This table presents time trend and summary statistics of clinical trials, FDA MAUDE recorded complaint reports and total recalls by fiscal year from 3 years before to 3 years after the implementation of regulation 
in September 2007. 
  




Table 9. Effect of FDAAA Regulation on FDA MAUDE Complaint Reports and Total Recalls 
Panel A: Sixteen-Quarter Window Results 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDA MAUDE 
Ln Total FDA 
MAUDE 
Adverse Event 
Ln Total Adverse 
Event 
Product Problem 
Ln Total Product 
Problem 
Recall Ln Total Recall 
                  
Post 0.0213* 0.1091*** 0.0182* 0.0652*** 0.0062 0.1139** 0.0091 0.0151 
  (1.68) (3.19) (1.70) (2.74) (0.66) (2.57) (1.04) (1.00) 
Constant -0.0544 0.2564 -0.0135 0.0637 -0.0112 0.2753 -0.0498 -0.1471 
  (-0.57) (1.12) (-0.13) (0.37) (-0.15) (1.25) (-0.77) (-1.26) 
                  
Observations 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7586 0.9341 0.7648 0.9406 0.8202 0.9138 0.5117 0.5546 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Balanced 16 
quarters / 8 
quarters in the pre- 
and post- period 
each 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level 
Subsample Pharmaceutical Firms subject to FDAAA 
This table presents subsample regression results pertaining to the trend analysis of consequences before and after FDAAA regulatory change within the pharmaceutical firms in the treatment group over the 16-
quarter (4-year) period. This subsample includes pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement. FDA MAUDE is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm was reported by a third party to FDA due to adverse event or product problem, 0 otherwise. Ln Total FDA MAUDE represents the log form of the number of FDA MAUDE complaint reports. Adverse Event is 
a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm was reported by a third party to FDA due to adverse event, 0 otherwise. Ln Total Adverse Event represents the log form of the number of FDA complaint reports due to 
adverse event. Product Problem is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm was reported by a third party to FDA due to product problem, 0 otherwise. Ln Product Problem represents the log form of the number of 
FDA MAUDE complaint reports due to product problem. Recall is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has made a recall, 0 otherwise. Ln Total Recall represents the log form of the number of total recalls 
including both drug and medical device recalls. Firm-level control variables are the same as those in the baseline model in Table 3. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  




Panel B: Twenty-Four-Quarter Window Results 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDA MAUDE 










Recall Ln Total Recall 
                  
Post 0.0282** 0.1671*** 0.0245** 0.1106*** 0.0128 0.1601*** 0.0217** 0.0335* 
  (2.24) (3.32) (2.17) (3.46) (1.45) (2.64) (2.58) (1.93) 
Constant -0.0119 0.3388 0.0056 0.0265 0.0300 0.3683 -0.1215* -0.2243* 
  (-0.15) (1.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.44) (1.08) (-1.69) (-1.80) 
                  
Observations 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,408 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7858 0.9153 0.7891 0.9237 0.8183 0.8948 0.4749 0.5302 
Sample period 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Balanced 24 
quarters / 12 
quarters in the 
pre- and post- 
period each 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level 
Subsample Pharmaceutical Firms subject to FDAAA 
This table presents robustness tests on regression results pertaining to the trend analysis of consequences before and after FDAAA regulatory change within the pharmaceutical firms in the treatment group over the 
24-quarter (6-year) period. This subsample includes pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results are required to be disclosed following FDAAA requirement. FDA MAUDE is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
firm was reported by a third party to FDA due to adverse event or product problem, 0 otherwise. Ln Total FDA MAUDE represents the log form of the number of FDA MAUDE complaint reports. Adverse Event is 
a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm was reported by a third party to FDA due to adverse event, 0 otherwise. Ln Total Adverse Event represents the log form of the number of FDA MAUDE complaint reports due 
to adverse event. Product Problem is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm was reported by a third party to FDA due to product problem, 0 otherwise. Ln Product Problem represents the log form of the number of 
FDA MAUDE complaint reports due to product problem. Recall is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has made a recall, 0 otherwise. Ln Total Recall represents the log form of the number of total recalls 
including both drug and medical device recalls. Firm-level control variables are the same as those in the baseline model in Table 3. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  





Table 10. Joint Effects of the FDAAA and its Associated Consequences on Bid-Ask Spread 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 Spread 100 
                  
FDA MAUDE 0.1022**               
  (2.20)               
FDA MAUDE X Post -0.3705***               
  (-5.35)               
Ln Total FDA MAUDE   -0.0501**             
    (-1.98)             
Ln Total FDA MAUDE X Post   -0.0558***             
    (-4.68)             
Adverse Event     0.0993**           
      (2.00)           
Adverse Event X Post     -0.3689***           
      (-5.09)           
Ln Total Adverse Event       -0.0154         
        (-0.57)         
Ln Total Adverse Event X Post       -0.0704***         
        (-4.65)         
Product Problem         0.0835       
          (1.49)       
Product Problem X Post         -0.3534***       
          (-4.98)       
Ln Total Product Problem           -0.0407     
            (-1.61)     
Ln Total Product Problem X Post           -0.0562***     
            (-4.43)     
Recall             0.1063***   
              (2.85)   
Recall X Post             -0.3814***   
              (-4.97)   
Ln Total Recall               0.0692** 
                (2.60) 
Ln Total Recall X Post               -0.2468*** 
                (-4.71) 
Constant 6.2287*** 6.3107*** 6.2456*** 6.2934*** 6.2535*** 6.3128*** 6.2779*** 6.2944*** 
  (10.04) (10.13) (10.06) (10.10) (10.06) (10.12) (10.09) (10.09) 
                  
Observations 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6873 0.6868 0.6870 0.6859 0.6864 0.6863 0.6854 0.6852 
Sample period 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Balanced 16 quarters / 
8 quarters in the pre- 
and post- period each 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Standard error Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level 
Subsample Pharmaceutical Firms subject to FDAAA 
This table presents regression results pertaining to the analysis of joint effects of the FDAAA and its associated consequences on bid-ask spread change within the pharmaceutical firms whose clinical trial results 
are required to be disclosed following the FDAAA. Please refer to Appendix for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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